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Eye	  gaze	  is	  a	  powerful	  directional	  cue	  that	  automatically	  evokes	  joint	  attention	  
states.	  Even	  when	  faces	  are	  ignored	  there	  is	  incidental	  learning	  of	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  gaze	  
cueing	  of	  another	  person,	  such	  that	  people	  who	  look	  away	  from	  targets	  are	  judged	  less	  
trustworthy.	  In	  a	  series	  of	  experiments	  we	  demonstrate	  further	  properties	  of	  the	  incidental	  
learning	  of	  trust	  from	  gaze	  direction.	  First,	  the	  emotion	  of	  the	  face,	  whether	  neutral	  or	  
smiling,	  influences	  the	  pattern	  of	  trust	  learning.	  Second,	  the	  effect	  is	  specific	  to	  judgements	  
of	  trust;	  reliability	  of	  gaze	  direction	  does	  not	  influence	  other	  emotional	  judgements	  of	  a	  
person,	  such	  as	  liking.	  And	  third,	  visuomotor	  fluency	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  learning	  of	  trust,	  
regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  face	  serves	  as	  a	  target	  or	  distractor.	  Taken	  together,	  incidental	  
learning	  of	  trust	  is	  influenced	  by	  facial	  emotion,	  it	  is	  a	  specific	  effect	  that	  does	  not	  
generalize	  to	  other	  emotional	  assessments,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  determined	  solely	  by	  processing	  
fluency.	  
Keywords:	  gaze-­‐cueing;	  task-­‐switching;	  expression;	  trait	  inference;	  visuomotor	  
fluency;	  emotion;	  trustworthiness;	  likeability	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There	  is	  a	  scene	  in	  the	  2006	  James	  Bond	  film	  Casino	  Royale	  where	  Daniel	  Craig’s	  Bond	  is	  
struggling	  with	  another	  man	  over	  a	  knife.	  During	  the	  fight,	  Bond	  hesitates	  and	  stares	  over	  
the	  other	  man’s	  shoulder,	  distracting	  his	  opponent	  temporarily	  and	  granting	  him	  the	  upper	  
hand.	  For	  most	  people,	  fights	  to	  the	  death	  are	  thankfully	  uncommon,	  but	  this	  misdirection	  
of	  one’s	  attention	  is	  a	  common	  trope	  that	  we	  all	  easily	  recognise.	  Redirection	  of	  our	  
attention	  based	  on	  somebody	  else’s	  can	  be	  perfectly	  innocent,	  as	  when	  someone	  genuinely	  
spots	  something	  that	  demands	  their	  and	  perhaps	  your	  own	  attention,	  or	  it	  can	  be	  the	  result	  
of	  a	  calculated	  deception,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  sleight	  of	  hand	  magic	  tricks.	  Interpreting	  such	  
events	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  social	  implications	  therefore	  reflects	  a	  key	  element	  of	  social	  
cognition.	  
	   Hence	  eye	  gaze	  is	  a	  powerful	  communicative	  tool.	  It	  can	  be	  used	  to	  reflexively	  
redirect	  another’s	  attention	  towards	  or	  away	  from	  a	  particular	  object	  or	  location	  (Driver	  et	  
al.,	  1999;	  Friesen	  &	  Kingstone,	  1998;	  Frischen	  &	  Tipper,	  2004).	  Due	  to	  its	  dual	  ability	  to	  
either	  facilitate	  attentional	  processing	  or	  misdirect	  it	  and	  incur	  a	  cost	  to	  processing	  fluency,	  
people	  can	  also	  infer	  higher	  order	  information	  from	  this;	  objects	  that	  are	  looked	  at	  tend	  to	  
be	  liked	  more	  (Bayliss,	  Paul,	  Cannon	  and	  Tipper,	  2006;	  Capozzi,	  Bayliss,	  Elena	  and	  Becchio,	  
2015;	  Manera,	  Elena,	  Bayliss	  and	  Becchio,	  2014;	  Ulloa,	  Marchetti,	  Taffou	  and	  George,	  2015)	  
and	  those	  who	  correctly	  cue	  an	  object	  location	  are	  chosen	  as	  more	  trustworthy	  than	  those	  
who	  mislead	  (Bayliss	  &	  Tipper,	  2006;	  Bayliss,	  Griffiths	  &	  Tipper,	  2009;	  Manssuer,	  Pawling,	  
Hayes	  &	  Tipper,	  2015;	  	  Rogers,	  Bayliss	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  
	   In	  the	  initial	  investigation	  of	  incidental	  learning	  of	  trust	  from	  gaze	  behaviour,	  
Bayliss	  and	  Tipper	  (2006)	  used	  a	  gaze-­‐cueing	  paradigm	  with	  a	  group	  of	  paired	  faces.	  One	  
face	  of	  each	  pair	  would	  always	  look	  towards	  a	  target	  object	  that	  participants	  had	  to	  identify	  
as	  either	  a	  kitchen	  or	  garage	  item	  (valid	  cue),	  while	  the	  other	  would	  always	  look	  away	  from	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the	  target	  (invalid	  cue).	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  participants	  were	  shown	  each	  face	  in	  
the	  pair	  and	  asked	  to	  select	  which	  they	  thought	  was	  more	  trustworthy.	  Despite	  having	  been	  
told	  that	  the	  gaze	  behaviour	  of	  the	  face	  was	  task-­‐irrelevant	  and	  that	  they	  should	  ignore	  the	  
face	  throughout	  the	  experiment,	  participants	  chose	  the	  valid	  cueing	  faces	  over	  invalid	  
cueing	  faces	  as	  more	  trustworthy.	  
	   This	  effect	  has	  been	  shown	  using	  this	  2-­‐alternative	  forced	  choice	  (2AFC)	  rating	  
procedure.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  explain	  how	  these	  changes	  come	  about:	  whether	  this	  
effect	  is	  driven	  by	  an	  increase	  in	  trustworthiness	  for	  valid	  faces,	  a	  decrease	  for	  invalid	  faces,	  
or	  a	  bidirectional	  mix	  of	  the	  two.	  To	  further	  investigate	  the	  specific	  nature	  of	  changes	  in	  
trust	  ratings	  two	  scalar	  ratings	  of	  trustworthiness	  will	  be	  employed	  in	  the	  current	  studies,	  
one	  at	  the	  beginning	  and	  one	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  to	  track	  changes	  in	  
trustworthiness	  for	  both	  valid	  and	  invalid	  faces	  (c.f.,	  Manssuer,	  Roberts	  &	  Tipper,	  2015).	  
This	  more	  sensitive	  measure	  provides	  the	  ideal	  approach	  to	  further	  investigate	  key	  
boundary	  conditions	  for	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  processes	  mediating	  incidental	  learning	  of	  
trust.	  	  
One	  outstanding	  issue	  where	  this	  new	  measure	  may	  be	  benefial	  concerns	  the	  role	  of	  
facial	  emotion.	  Bayliss,	  Griffiths	  and	  Tipper	  (2009)	  found	  that	  gaze-­‐contingent	  trust	  effects	  
appear	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  positive	  social	  context,	  as	  they	  found	  no	  trust	  effects	  when	  the	  faces	  
expressed	  anger	  and	  a	  reliable	  effect	  only	  when	  the	  faces	  smiled.	  However,	  the	  neutral	  
expression	  condition	  was	  somewhat	  ambiguous,	  as	  participants	  were	  only	  slightly	  more	  
likely	  to	  select	  the	  valid	  face	  as	  the	  more	  trustworthy	  of	  a	  matched	  pair	  in	  a	  2AFC	  paradigm.	  
This	  previous	  work	  using	  forced	  choice	  between	  valid	  and	  invalid	  cueing	  individuals	  creates	  
a	  somewhat	  blunt	  measure;	  we	  can	  see	  that	  valid	  faces	  are	  preferred	  over	  invalid,	  but	  we	  
do	  not	  know	  if	  this	  is	  because	  valid	  faces	  become	  more	  trustworthy,	  invalid	  become	  less,	  or	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some	  combination	  of	  the	  two.	  We	  also	  do	  not	  know	  how	  exactly	  the	  emotional	  expression	  
of	  a	  face	  might	  change	  the	  pattern	  of	  results	  using	  forced-­‐choice	  measures	  of	  
trustworthiness.	  It	  still	  could	  be	  the	  case	  that	  neutral	  faces	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  elicit	  
learning	  of	  trust	  –	  there	  is	  a	  wealth	  of	  evidence	  that	  smiling	  faces	  are	  treated	  differently	  
from	  neutral	  faces	  in	  various	  social	  interactions,	  both	  when	  measured	  by	  trustworthiness	  
judgements	  (Hehman,	  Flake	  &	  Freeman,	  2015)	  and	  by	  more	  implicit	  measures	  (Wang	  &	  
Hamilton,	  2014)	  –	  or	  it	  may	  be	  that	  we	  can	  detect	  trust	  learning	  with	  neutral	  faces	  using	  this	  
new,	  more	  sensitive	  measure.	  	  	  
Therefore	  we	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  emotion	  in	  the	  incidental	  learning	  of	  trust	  in	  
conditions	  where	  faces	  express	  neutral	  emotions	  (Experiment	  1)	  and	  when	  they	  smile	  
(Experiment	  2).	  We	  will	  be	  able	  to	  unequivocally	  identify	  whether	  incidental	  learning	  of	  
trust	  from	  gaze	  cueing	  can	  be	  detected	  when	  faces	  express	  neutral	  emotions.	  Additionally,	  
and	  more	  importantly,	  we	  can	  assess	  whether	  the	  pattern	  of	  learning	  (whether	  valid	  faces	  
increase	  in	  trust	  and	  invalid	  faces	  decline	  in	  trustworthiness,	  or	  whether	  the	  effects	  are	  uni-­‐
directional)	  is	  the	  same	  for	  both	  neutral	  and	  positive	  emotions.	  	  
The	  further	  issue	  we	  investigate	  is	  whether	  incidental	  learning	  of	  eye-­‐gaze	  patterns	  
is	  specific	  to	  judgements	  of	  trust,	  or	  generalizes	  to	  other	  emotional	  assessments,	  such	  as	  
liking	  of	  a	  person.	  One	  might	  assume	  that	  trust	  and	  liking	  will	  be	  closely	  related:	  if	  we	  trust	  
someone,	  we	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  like	  them.	  Indeed,	  the	  two	  are	  often	  conflated	  as	  aspects	  of	  
warmth	  in	  dual-­‐dimension	  theories	  of	  social	  cognition	  (e.g.	  Fiske,	  Cuddy	  &	  Glick,	  2007).	  
However,	  subtle	  behaviours	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  deceive	  others,	  such	  as	  gaze	  shifts,	  could	  
have	  quite	  specific	  effects	  on	  trust.	  For	  example,	  whether	  to	  invest	  money	  with	  another	  
person	  is	  influenced	  by	  incidental	  learning	  of	  patterns	  of	  gaze	  shifts,	  as	  is	  the	  decision	  to	  be	  
altruistic	  while	  computing	  the	  likelihood	  that	  such	  an	  act	  will	  be	  reciprocated	  in	  the	  future	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(Rogers,	  Bayliss	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Such	  decisions	  might	  not	  be	  affected	  by	  general	  feelings	  of	  
liking,	  for	  example	  we	  may	  trust	  a	  lawyer	  to	  do	  their	  utmost	  to	  preserve	  our	  freedom,	  but	  
we	  may	  not	  like	  them	  on	  a	  personal	  level;	  the	  two	  feelings	  are	  distinct,	  and	  can	  be	  
separated.	  To	  our	  knowledge,	  there	  is	  little	  previous	  work	  directly	  addressing	  the	  question	  
of	  whether	  trust	  and	  liking	  are	  functionally	  similar	  in	  this	  way,	  so	  in	  Experiment	  3	  we	  replace	  
the	  trustworthiness	  ratings	  of	  Experiment	  1	  with	  likeability	  ratings,	  to	  see	  if	  this	  incidental	  
learning	  is	  specific	  to	  trust	  or	  if	  there	  is	  a	  broader	  affective	  spillover	  into	  other	  social	  
judgements.	  
The	  final	  issue	  concerns	  the	  role	  of	  visuomotor	  fluency	  in	  the	  learning	  of	  trust.	  In	  the	  
gaze	  cueing	  procedure	  there	  are	  two	  aspects	  that	  might	  mediate	  the	  learning	  of	  trust.	  One	  
of	  these	  is	  the	  behaviour	  of	  another	  person.	  As	  noted,	  gaze	  can	  be	  used	  to	  help	  or	  deceive	  
another	  person.	  That	  is,	  looking	  towards	  interesting	  and	  desirable	  objects	  to	  facilitate	  a	  
conspecific’s	  behaviour,	  or	  looking	  away	  from	  desirable	  objects	  to	  mislead.	  The	  second	  
aspect	  is	  the	  visuomotor	  fluency	  experienced	  during	  gaze	  cueing.	  That	  is,	  responses	  are	  
faster	  on	  valid	  trials	  where	  gaze	  orients	  a	  person’s	  attention	  to	  the	  location	  where	  a	  target	  
will	  appear.	  Previous	  work	  has	  shown	  that	  facilitating	  both	  perceptual	  (e.g.,	  Reber,	  
Winkielman	  &	  Schwartz,	  1998)	  and	  motor	  (e.g.,	  Hayes,	  Paul,	  Beuger	  &	  Tipper,	  2008)	  
performance	  increases	  preference	  and	  liking	  of	  images	  and	  objects.	  
Therefore	  we	  investigate	  the	  incidental	  learning	  of	  trust	  in	  a	  task	  where	  increased	  
processing	  fluency	  is	  associated	  with	  some	  faces	  and	  impaired	  processing	  fluency	  is	  
associated	  with	  other	  faces	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  gaze	  cueing	  studies.	  However,	  there	  are	  no	  
face	  behaviours,	  such	  as	  gaze	  shifts,	  that	  might	  be	  associated	  with	  deception.	  To	  this	  end	  we	  
develop	  two	  new	  task	  switching	  procedures	  in	  Experiments	  4	  and	  5,	  and	  consistently	  
associate	  some	  face	  identities	  with	  fluent,	  fast	  and	  accurate	  processing	  and	  other	  faces	  with	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impaired	  slow	  and	  error	  prone	  processing.	  In	  Experiment	  4	  we	  develop	  a	  task-­‐switching	  
procedure	  where	  the	  faces	  are	  now	  the	  targets	  of	  participants’	  decisions,	  and	  in	  Experiment	  
5	  we	  use	  a	  design	  where	  the	  faces	  remain	  background	  distractors.	  If	  visuomotor	  fluency	  is	  
the	  key	  driver	  for	  the	  learning	  of	  trust,	  then	  effects	  should	  be	  detected	  in	  one	  or	  both	  of	  
these	  new	  tasks.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  cues	  to	  deception	  such	  as	  eye-­‐gaze	  are	  necessary,	  
then	  no	  learning	  of	  trust	  will	  be	  detected.	  
To	  briefly	  preview	  our	  findings:	  	  We	  find	  that	  face	  emotion	  does	  influence	  the	  
learning	  of	  trust	  from	  gaze	  behaviour,	  but	  in	  a	  selective	  manner.	  That	  is,	  when	  faces	  express	  
neutral	  emotions,	  there	  is	  a	  decline	  in	  trust	  for	  invalid	  faces	  that	  look	  away	  from	  targets.	  No	  
such	  effect	  is	  observed	  with	  valid	  faces,	  except	  for	  when	  these	  faces	  are	  seen	  smiling.	  When	  
examining	  the	  generalizability	  of	  the	  trust	  effect,	  somewhat	  counter-­‐intuitively,	  we	  find	  no	  
effects	  when	  assessing	  liking	  of	  another	  person.	  And	  finally,	  in	  both	  task	  switching	  
procedures,	  where	  the	  faces	  were	  targets,	  and	  where	  they	  were	  distractors,	  there	  were	  no	  
changes	  in	  trust	  assessments,	  suggesting	  that	  changes	  in	  visuomotor	  fluency	  are	  not	  
sufficient	  to	  generate	  learning	  of	  trust.	  
Experiment	  1	  
We	  re-­‐examine	  whether	  incidental	  learning	  of	  trust	  can	  be	  detected	  with	  faces	  expressing	  




A	  total	  of	  24	  participants	  (18	  female)	  volunteered	  for	  the	  study	  in	  return	  for	  payment	  or	  
course	  credit.	  All	  were	  students	  of	  the	  University	  of	  York,	  and	  had	  a	  mean	  age	  of	  19.96	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years.	  All	  participants	  in	  all	  experiments	  described	  in	  this	  study	  provided	  written	  consent	  
and	  the	  research	  was	  given	  ethical	  approval	  by	  the	  Departmental	  Ethics	  Committee	  of	  the	  
University	  of	  York	  Psychology	  Department.	  
Stimuli	  
Target	  stimuli	  for	  the	  object	  classification	  task	  were	  the	  kitchen	  and	  garage	  object	  images	  
used	  in	  Bayliss	  and	  Tipper	  (2006).	  There	  were	  13	  unique	  objects	  in	  each	  group	  
(kitchen/garage)	  that	  appeared	  in	  both	  left	  and	  right	  orientations.	  All	  of	  the	  stimuli	  were	  
coloured	  in	  blue.	  In	  total,	  there	  were	  52	  individual	  images	  used	  in	  the	  experiment.	  Face	  
stimuli	  were	  taken	  from	  the	  Karolinska	  Directed	  Emotional	  Faces	  (KDEF)	  stimulus	  set	  
(Lundqvist,	  Flykt	  &	  Öhman,	  1998),	  and	  included	  sixteen	  images;	  eight	  male	  and	  eight	  female.	  
These	  faces	  were	  initially	  selected	  by	  eye	  from	  a	  figure	  in	  the	  Supplementary	  Material	  of	  
Oosterhof	  and	  Todorov	  (2008),	  in	  which	  the	  faces	  from	  this	  set	  are	  plotted	  along	  six	  
judgement	  dimensions.	  The	  faces	  used	  were	  all	  taken	  from	  the	  centre	  (1SD	  from	  the	  
intercection	  of	  all	  six	  dimensions)	  of	  this	  plot,	  so	  the	  faces	  used	  in	  our	  experiments	  were,	  
compared	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  KDEF	  set,	  as	  close	  to	  neutral	  trait	  judgements	  as	  possible.1	  
These	  faces	  were	  split	  into	  two	  groups,	  which	  would	  appear	  as	  either	  valid	  or	  invalid	  cues	  in	  
the	  experiment	  (counterbalanced	  across	  participant).	  The	  eyes	  of	  each	  face	  were	  
manipulated	  using	  Adobe	  Photoshop	  CS6	  to	  generate	  faces	  where	  the	  eye	  gaze	  was	  either	  
straight	  ahead,	  left	  or	  right.	  Unaltered	  images	  were	  used	  for	  the	  trustworthiness	  rating	  
sections.	  
The	  study	  was	  run	  on	  an	  Intel	  Core	  i5	  PC	  with	  a	  21.5”	  monitor.	  The	  experiment	  was	  
presented	  using	  E-­‐Prime	  2.0	  software	  with	  a	  white	  background	  throughout	  and	  the	  
resolution	  set	  to	  1024x768	  pixels.	  Participants	  were	  sat	  approximately	  60cm	  from	  the	  
display,	  and	  during	  trustworthiness	  ratings	  the	  face	  stimuli	  had	  a	  visual	  angle	  of	  19.29°	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horizontally	  and	  20.97°	  vertically,	  while	  during	  gaze-­‐cueing	  the	  face	  stimuli	  had	  a	  visual	  
angle	  of	  13.36˚	  horizontally	  and	  14.93˚	  vertically.	  
Design	  and	  Procedure	  
Participants	  were	  told	  that	  they	  would	  be	  asked	  to	  perform	  an	  object	  categorisation	  task	  on	  
images	  of	  objects	  that	  appeared	  on	  the	  left	  or	  right	  side	  of	  the	  screen,	  and	  to	  respond	  with	  
whether	  these	  were	  garage	  or	  kitchen	  objects.	  They	  were	  also	  told	  that	  the	  central	  face	  
images	  were	  irrelevant	  and	  to	  be	  ignored.	  Before	  the	  experiment	  participants	  were	  allowed	  
to	  study	  printed	  versions	  of	  the	  kitchen/garage	  images,	  in	  order	  to	  familiarise	  themselves.	  
This	  was	  done	  firstly	  to	  ensure	  that	  participants	  had	  the	  knowledge	  of	  what	  each	  object	  
was,	  and	  secondly	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  early	  responses	  from	  the	  first	  trial	  block	  were	  not	  
confounded	  by	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  the	  object	  categories	  of	  the	  targets.	  	  
[Figure	  1	  approximately	  here]	  
Each	  trial	  began	  with	  a	  600ms	  fixation	  cross	  in	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  screen,	  which	  was	  
then	  replaced	  by	  a	  face	  showing	  a	  direct	  gaze	  for	  1,500ms.	  The	  face	  then	  shifted	  gaze	  either	  
to	  the	  left	  or	  right	  for	  500ms	  before	  the	  target	  stimulus	  appeared	  on	  either	  the	  same	  (valid)	  
or	  opposite	  (invalid;	  see	  Figure	  1a)	  side	  of	  the	  gaze	  direction.	  The	  target	  stimulus	  remained	  
either	  until	  the	  participant’s	  response	  was	  logged	  or	  until	  2,500ms	  had	  passed,	  following	  
which	  participants	  received	  feedback	  from	  an	  error	  tone	  that	  would	  sound	  if	  an	  incorrect	  
response	  was	  logged.	  The	  face	  then	  shifted	  back	  to	  direct	  gaze	  for	  a	  further	  1,000ms.	  A	  
blank	  screen	  followed	  for	  500ms	  before	  the	  next	  trial	  began.	  The	  trial	  structure	  is	  shown	  in	  
Figure	  1b.	  
The	  object	  categorisation	  responses	  were	  the	  H	  key	  and	  the	  Space	  bar	  of	  a	  keyboard,	  
chosen	  because	  the	  H	  key	  appears	  directly	  above	  the	  Space	  bar	  on	  QWERTY	  keyboards	  and	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this	  direction	  was	  orthogonal	  to	  the	  possible	  location	  of	  the	  target.	  Participants	  were	  
instructed	  to	  respond	  with	  their	  index	  finger	  on	  the	  H	  key	  and	  thumb	  on	  the	  Space	  bar.	  For	  
half	  of	  the	  participants,	  H	  represented	  Kitchen	  objects,	  while	  for	  the	  other	  half	  it	  
represented	  Garage	  objects.	  
In	  total	  there	  were	  five	  blocks	  of	  32	  trials	  each,	  and	  each	  face	  appeared	  twice	  in	  each	  
block,	  once	  gazing	  left	  and	  once	  right	  (ten	  times	  in	  total	  across	  the	  experiment;	  five	  left,	  five	  
right).	  The	  order	  of	  faces	  was	  randomised,	  as	  was	  the	  order	  of	  target	  objects,	  the	  side	  that	  
the	  target	  appeared,	  and	  the	  order	  of	  valid	  and	  invalid	  trials.	  
At	  the	  beginning	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  participants	  rated	  the	  original	  
unmanipulated	  face	  images	  used	  to	  generate	  the	  gaze	  cueing	  stimuli.	  Participants	  were	  
shown	  a	  calibration	  slide	  where	  they	  clicked	  in	  the	  centre	  to	  start,	  and	  then	  the	  face	  images	  
were	  presented	  for	  1,000ms.	  Participants	  were	  then	  instructed	  to	  click	  along	  an	  
uninterrupted	  scale	  at	  a	  point	  that	  conformed	  to	  how	  trustworthy	  they	  felt	  the	  person	  was.	  
The	  scale	  recorded	  response	  clicks	  between	  -­‐100	  and	  +100,	  calculated	  by	  the	  distance	  from	  
the	  centre	  of	  the	  scale	  −	  responses	  to	  the	  left	  of	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  scale	  were	  coded	  as	  
negative,	  while	  those	  to	  the	  right	  were	  coded	  as	  positive	  (these	  were	  indicated	  on	  the	  
screen	  with	  a	  −	  and	  +	  sign	  at	  either	  end	  of	  the	  scale).	  Identities	  were	  presented	  in	  a	  
randomised	  order.	  
After	  the	  experiment,	  we	  asked	  all	  participants	  what	  they	  thought	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
experiment	  had	  been	  and	  if	  they	  had	  picked	  up	  on	  the	  experimental	  manipulation.	  While	  
some	  participants	  did	  demonstrate	  suspicion	  of	  the	  manipulation	  in	  this	  and	  later	  gaze-­‐
cueing	  experiments,	  it	  was	  rare	  for	  any	  participant	  to	  spontaneously	  describe	  the	  pattern	  of	  
eye	  gaze.	  To	  offer	  a	  qualitative	  interpretation,	  many	  answers	  were	  given	  hesitantly	  and	  
made	  it	  appear	  that	  participants	  were	  thinking	  back	  over	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  experiment	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and	  inferring	  from	  that	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  an	  answer,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  own	  
in-­‐the-­‐moment	  intuition	  during	  gaze-­‐cueing.	  	  
Data	  Analysis	  
Before	  data	  were	  analysed,	  participants’	  responses	  were	  filtered	  to	  remove	  all	  error	  trials	  
(where	  participants	  reported	  the	  incorrect	  answer)	  and	  RT	  outliers	  −	  RTs	  below	  250ms	  (too	  
short	  to	  process	  the	  stimuli)	  and	  above	  2,500ms	  (indicating	  that	  participants	  had	  not	  given	  a	  
response	  in	  the	  allotted	  time).	  The	  number	  of	  remaining	  trials	  was	  then	  compared	  with	  the	  
original	  number	  of	  trials	  to	  check	  that	  all	  participants	  retained	  at	  least	  70%	  of	  their	  total	  
trials	  and	  had	  not	  scored	  below	  70%	  total	  correct	  on	  any	  one	  condition.	  Mean	  RTs	  and	  
percentage	  accuracy	  scores	  were	  calculated	  for	  each	  participant	  for	  both	  valid	  and	  invalid	  
trials	  for	  each	  block	  separately.	  RTs	  and	  accuracy	  rates	  for	  each	  block	  were	  compared	  in	  
separate	  2x5	  (validity	  x	  block)	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVAs.	  
Average	  trustworthiness	  ratings	  were	  calculated	  for	  each	  participant	  both	  at	  the	  
beginning	  (pre)	  and	  end	  (post)	  of	  the	  experiment	  for	  both	  valid	  and	  invalid	  faces,	  and	  these	  
scores	  were	  analysed	  in	  a	  2x2	  (time	  x	  validity)	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA.	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  
Gaze	  Cueing	  
The	  RT	  results	  of	  Experiment	  1	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2a.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  five	  blocks,	  
RTs	  were	  lower	  to	  valid	  than	  invalid	  trials.	  A	  2x5	  ANOVA	  found	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  validity	  	  
(F(1,23)=47.94,	  p<0.0001,	  η2G	  =0.02)	  and	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  block	  where	  responses	  were	  faster	  
in	  later	  blocks	  than	  earlier	  (using	  Greenhouse	  Geisser	  correction	  for	  violation	  of	  sphericity	  
assumption:	  F(1.92,44.16)=21.51,	  p<0.0001,	  η2G	  =0.13)	  but	  no	  interaction	  (F(4,92)=1.14,	  
p=0.3448,	  η2G	  =0.00).	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[Figure	  2	  approximately	  here]	  
A	  similar	  2x5	  ANOVA	  using	  accuracy	  scores	  (coded	  as	  percent	  correct	  in	  each	  trial	  
type	  in	  each	  of	  the	  five	  blocks;	  see	  Table	  1)	  found	  only	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  block	  (F(4,92)=3.36,	  
p=0.0129,	  	  η2G	  =	  0.05),	  as	  participants	  generally	  committed	  more	  errors	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  
the	  experiment	  than	  the	  end,	  but	  there	  was	  no	  overall	  effect	  of	  cueing	  validity	  on	  errors	  
(F(1,23)=0.15,	  p=0.7002,	  	  η2G	  =	  0.00),	  and	  no	  interaction	  of	  validity	  and	  block	  (F(4,92)=1.46,	  
p=0.2204,	  	  η2G	  =	  0.01).	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  attention	  cueing	  effect	  emerged	  
primarily	  in	  RT	  measures	  rather	  than	  error	  rates,	  and	  that	  it	  remained	  stable	  over	  time.	  	  
[Table	  1	  approximately	  here]	  
Trustworthiness	  Ratings	  
A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  with	  rating	  time	  (pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐experiment)	  and	  cueing	  
validity	  of	  faces	  (valid	  and	  invalid)	  as	  within-­‐subjects	  factors	  found	  a	  significant	  overall	  effect	  
of	  time	  where	  ratings	  were	  lower	  after	  the	  experiment	  than	  before	  (F(1,23)=10.49,	  
p=0.0036,	  η2G	  =0.08)	  and	  one	  of	  cueing	  validity	  where	  ratings	  were	  lower	  for	  invalid	  faces	  
than	  valid	  (F(1,23)=7.23,	  p=0.0131,	  η2G	  =0.13).	  There	  was	  also	  a	  significant	  interaction	  
between	  the	  time	  of	  rating	  and	  cueing	  validity	  (F(1,23)=7.19,	  p=0.0133,	  η2G	  =0.09).	  Figure	  3a	  
shows	  how	  the	  trustworthiness	  ratings	  for	  each	  group	  change	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  
experiment.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  are	  no	  changes	  in	  trust	  for	  faces	  that	  consistently	  looked	  
towards	  targets	  (Valid:	  t(23)=0.07,	  p=0.9455),	  whereas	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  decline	  in	  
trustworthiness	  for	  faces	  that	  consistently	  looked	  away	  from	  targets	  (Invalid:	  t(23)=-­‐4.19,	  
p=0.0003).	  	  
[Figure	  3	  approximately	  here]	  
The	  results	  of	  Experiment	  1	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  trust	  effect	  can	  be	  obtained	  with	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neutral	  faces,	  where	  previously	  such	  effects	  were	  not	  clearly	  demonstrated	  (e.g.	  Bayliss	  et	  
al.,	  2009).	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐experiment	  assessments	  that	  allow	  measures	  
of	  change	  in	  trust	  for	  each	  face,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  an	  unmarked	  analogue	  scale,	  are	  more	  
sensitive	  measures	  than	  the	  forced-­‐choice	  decision	  used	  in	  previous	  work.	  Finally,	  it	  is	  
noteworthy	  that	  there	  is	  an	  asymmetry	  in	  the	  effect	  in	  that	  only	  invalid	  faces	  decline	  in	  
trustworthiness,	  while	  valid	  faces	  do	  not	  change	  in	  trust	  ratings.	  Experiment	  2	  explores	  
whether	  this	  holds	  true	  when	  faces	  express	  positive	  emotions.	  
Experiment	  2	  
This	  experiment	  aims	  to	  explore	  how	  emotion	  affects	  this	  incidental	  learning	  of	  trust.	  This	  
replicates	  all	  details	  of	  Experiment	  1,	  but	  uses	  smiling	  rather	  than	  neutral	  face	  images	  as	  the	  
cueing	  and	  rating	  stimuli.	  Note	  that	  Bayliss,	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  demonstrated	  significant	  learning	  
of	  trust	  when	  the	  faces	  expressed	  positive	  emotions	  with	  a	  smile.	  However,	  when	  the	  faces	  
expressed	  a	  neutral	  emotion	  the	  same	  pattern	  of	  trust	  was	  observed,	  but	  it	  was	  of	  marginal	  
significance.	  Experiment	  1	  has	  shown	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  detect	  significant	  learning	  of	  trust	  
when	  faces	  are	  neutral,	  however	  the	  effect	  was	  asymmetrical,	  as	  invalid	  faces	  declined	  in	  
trust	  and	  valid	  faces	  did	  not	  change.	  Whether	  faces	  expressing	  positive	  emotions	  produce	  
this	  same	  pattern	  is	  the	  key	  question	  for	  Experiment	  2.	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
24	  participants	  (21	  female,	  mean	  age	  20.46)	  volunteered	  for	  this	  study	  in	  return	  for	  course	  
credit	  or	  payment.	  
Stimuli,	  Design	  and	  Procedure	  
This	  experiment	  was	  identical	  to	  Experiment	  1	  in	  every	  way	  except	  that	  the	  KDEF	  faces	  used	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were	  frontal-­‐view	  smiling	  faces	  rather	  than	  neutral	  faces	  both	  during	  the	  gaze-­‐cueing	  
portion	  of	  the	  experiment	  and	  at	  both	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐trustworthiness	  rating	  presentations.	  
All	  other	  details	  were	  identical.	  
Data	  Analysis	  
RT	  filters	  and	  analysis	  of	  RTs,	  error	  rates	  and	  trustworthiness	  ratings	  data	  were	  identical	  to	  
those	  in	  Experiment	  1.	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  
Gaze-­‐Cueing	  
The	  results	  of	  Experiment	  2	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2b.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  five	  blocks,	  RTs	  
were	  faster	  to	  valid	  than	  invalid	  trials.	  A	  2x5	  ANOVA	  found	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  validity	  
(F(1,23)=25.58,	  p<0.0001,	  η2G	  =0.02)	  and	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  block	  (GG	  corrected:	  
F(1.86,42.72)=31.33,	  p<0.0001,	  η2G	  =0.25)	  but	  no	  interaction	  (GG	  corrected:	  F(4,92)=1.22,	  
p=0.3063,	  η2G	  =0.00).	  
A	  2x5	  (validity	  x	  block)	  ANOVA	  on	  the	  accuracy	  rates	  (see	  Table	  1)	  found	  the	  main	  
effect	  of	  block	  approached	  but	  did	  not	  reach	  significance	  (F(4,92)=2.07,	  p=0.0912,	  η2G	  =0.05)	  	  
and	  there	  was	  no	  effect	  of	  validity	  (F(1,23)=0.09,	  p=0.7693,	  η2G	  =0.00)	  or	  interaction	  
between	  the	  two	  (F(4,92)=1.27,	  p=0.2874,	  η2G	  =0.01).	  
Trustworthiness	  Ratings	  
The	  changes	  in	  trustworthiness	  ratings	  for	  the	  faces	  in	  Experiment	  2	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3b.	  
A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  with	  rating	  time	  (pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐experiment)	  and	  cueing	  
validity	  of	  faces	  (valid	  and	  invalid)	  as	  within-­‐subjects	  factors	  found	  no	  overall	  effect	  of	  time	  
(F(1,23)=0.02,	  p=0.9022,	  η2G	  =0.00),	  but	  did	  find	  a	  significant	  effect	  of	  cueing	  validity	  where	  
valid	  faces	  were	  rated	  higher	  than	  invalid	  faces	  (F(1,23)=5.48,	  p=0.0282,	  η2G	  =0.07),	  as	  well	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as	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  the	  time	  of	  rating	  and	  cueing	  validity	  (F(1,23)=12.08,	  
p=0.0020,	  η2G	  =0.10).	  As	  in	  Experiment	  1,	  there	  was	  a	  decline	  in	  trustworthiness	  ratings	  for	  
invalid	  faces	  that	  looked	  away	  from	  targets	  that	  in	  this	  experiment	  approached	  significance	  
(Invalid:	  t(23)=-­‐1.78,	  p=0.0882),	  but	  now	  we	  also	  detect	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  
trustworthiness	  for	  valid	  faces	  that	  looked	  towards	  targets	  (Valid:	  t(23)=2.20,	  p=0.0381).	  
	   To	  explore	  the	  contrasts	  between	  Experiment	  1	  and	  2	  post-­‐hoc	  tests	  examining	  
the	  change	  in	  trust	  for	  valid	  faces	  and	  invalid	  faces	  were	  examined.	  Due	  to	  violations	  of	  the	  
normality	  assumption,	  separate	  Mann-­‐Whitney	  U	  tests	  were	  performed	  on	  the	  data.	  	  When	  
examining	  the	  change	  in	  trust	  for	  valid	  faces	  that	  consistently	  looked	  towards	  targets,	  
increases	  in	  trust	  were	  greater	  when	  the	  faces	  were	  smiling	  than	  when	  neutral	  (U=181,	  
p=0.0281).	  	  In	  contrast,	  whether	  faces	  were	  smiling	  or	  neutral	  had	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  decline	  
in	  trust	  ratings	  for	  the	  invalid	  faces	  that	  looked	  away	  from	  targets	  (U=282,	  p=0.9097).2	  
As	  noted,	  Bayliss	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  observed	  that	  smiling	  faces	  produced	  more	  robust	  
trust	  effects	  than	  neutral	  faces.	  	  However,	  this	  previous	  work	  required	  forced	  choice	  
between	  previously	  valid	  and	  invalid	  faces.	  Such	  forced	  choice	  measures	  cannot	  identify	  
whether	  the	  effects	  are	  specific	  to	  valid	  faces	  increasing	  in	  trust,	  invalid	  decline	  in	  trust,	  or	  
both.	  	  The	  current	  approach	  enables	  a	  more	  detailed	  analysis	  where	  change	  in	  trust	  ratings	  
can	  identify	  the	  specific	  patterns	  of	  trust	  effects.	  	  We	  can	  now	  see	  that	  the	  more	  robust	  
trust	  effects	  are	  specifically	  due	  to	  increases	  in	  trust	  of	  valid	  faces	  only	  when	  they	  are	  
smiling.	  Conversely,	  a	  decrease	  in	  trustworthiness	  for	  invalid	  faces	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  stable,	  
key	  feature	  of	  this	  effect.	  By	  comparing	  trust	  learning	  in	  response	  to	  neutral	  faces	  with	  that	  
of	  smiling	  faces,	  we	  provide	  the	  first	  evidence	  that	  this	  incidental	  learning	  is	  asymmetrical	  
(for	  a	  more	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  possible	  implications	  and	  mechanisms	  underlying	  this	  
asymmetricality,	  see	  the	  General	  Discussion).	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Based	  on	  previous	  research	  (Bayliss	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Pecchinenda,	  Pes,	  Ferlazzo	  &	  
Zoccolotti,	  2008;)	  we	  might	  expect	  that	  social	  expectations	  driven	  by	  emotional	  expression	  
(i.e.	  that	  smiling	  faces	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  helpful)	  might	  influence	  the	  incidental	  learning	  of	  
trustworthiness.	  	  That	  is,	  valid	  smiling	  faces	  confirm	  the	  expectations	  and	  so	  lead	  to	  a	  
stronger	  increase	  in	  trust,	  while	  invalid	  smiling	  faces	  violate	  the	  expectation	  and	  so	  lead	  to	  a	  
decrease	  in	  trust.	  	  In	  contrast,	  a	  neutral	  stare	  for	  social	  primates	  can	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  
threat	  and	  hence	  the	  detection	  of	  negative	  events	  such	  as	  potential	  deception	  by	  invalid	  
faces	  that	  consistently	  look	  away	  from	  targets	  takes	  precedence	  and	  there	  is	  little	  learning	  
of	  the	  positive	  events	  such	  as	  joint	  attention	  produced	  by	  valid	  faces.	  	  
Experiment	  3	  
Experiments	  1	  and	  2	  have	  confirmed	  that	  even	  when	  a	  face	  is	  irrelevant	  and	  could	  be	  
ignored	  while	  focussing	  on	  the	  main	  task	  of	  peripheral	  target	  classification,	  there	  is	  learning	  
of	  the	  gaze	  patterns	  of	  another	  person.	  	  That	  is,	  an	  association	  between	  face	  identity	  and	  
reliability	  of	  gaze	  direction	  is	  learned	  and	  this	  is	  retrieved	  when	  re-­‐encountering	  faces	  at	  a	  
later	  time.	  	  Thus,	  incidental	  learning	  of	  gaze	  direction	  subsequently	  changes	  how	  much	  
another	  person	  is	  trusted,	  and	  this	  is	  affected	  to	  some	  extent	  by	  the	  emotional	  expression	  
of	  the	  person.	  	  	  
The	  next	  studies	  further	  investigate	  the	  properties	  of	  this	  incidental	  learning	  process.	  	  
Experiment	  3	  explores	  whether	  this	  impression	  is	  specific	  to	  trust	  or	  simply	  reflects	  a	  
broader	  valence	  impression	  of	  the	  face.	  Therefore,	  this	  experiment	  is	  identical	  to	  
Experiment	  1	  except	  that	  it	  makes	  one	  very	  minor	  change:	  that	  is,	  the	  question	  that	  
participants	  are	  asked	  was	  changed	  from	  one	  of	  “How	  trustworthy	  do	  you	  think	  this	  person	  
is?”	  to	  “How	  likeable	  do	  you	  think	  this	  person	  is?”	  
Methods	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Participants	  
26	  participants	  (21	  female,	  mean	  age	  18.99)	  volunteered	  for	  this	  study	  in	  return	  for	  course	  
credit	  or	  payment.	  One	  participant’s	  data	  were	  not	  collected	  due	  to	  a	  computer	  
malfunction,	  and	  1	  participant	  had	  to	  be	  removed	  after	  RT	  filters	  were	  applied,	  so	  the	  final	  
number	  available	  for	  analysis	  was	  24.	  
Stimuli,	  Design	  and	  Procedure	  
This	  experiment	  was	  identical	  to	  Experiment	  1	  except	  that	  at	  the	  beginning	  and	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  experiment,	  participants	  were	  asked,	  “How	  likeable	  do	  you	  think	  this	  person	  is?”	  rather	  
than	  “How	  trustworthy	  do	  you	  think	  this	  person	  is?”	  and	  all	  mentions	  of	  trustworthiness	  on	  
consent	  forms	  and	  instructions	  were	  replaced	  with	  the	  words	  likeable	  or	  likeability	  
(dependent	  on	  context).	  
Data	  Analysis	  
RT	  filters	  were	  applied	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  in	  Experiments	  1	  and	  2,	  and	  in	  this	  experiment	  1	  
participant	  had	  to	  be	  removed	  for	  retaining	  less	  than	  70%	  of	  their	  original	  trials.	  
Average	  likeability	  ratings	  were	  calculated	  for	  each	  participant	  both	  at	  the	  beginning	  
(pre)	  and	  end	  (post)	  of	  the	  experiment	  for	  both	  valid	  and	  invalid	  faces,	  and	  these	  scores	  
were	  analysed	  in	  a	  2x2	  (time	  x	  validity)	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA.	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  
Gaze-­‐Cueing	  
The	  results	  of	  Experiment	  3	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2c.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  five	  blocks,	  RTs	  
were	  faster	  to	  valid	  than	  invalid	  trials.	  A	  2x5	  ANOVA	  found	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  validity	  
(F(1,23)=14.45,	  p=0.0009,	  η2G	  =0.02)	  and	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  block	  (using	  Greenhouse	  Geisser	  
correction	  for	  violation	  of	  sphericity	  assumption:	  F(2.18,50.24)=37.73,	  p<0.0001,	  η2G	  =0.23)	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but	  no	  interaction	  (GG	  corrected:	  F(2.44,56.13)=1.60,	  p=0.3768,	  η2G	  =0.00).	  
A	  2x5	  ANOVA	  on	  accuracy	  rates	  (see	  Table	  1)	  found	  no	  main	  effects	  of	  block	  or	  
validity,	  or	  any	  interaction	  between	  the	  two.	  	  
Likeability	  Ratings	  
The	  changes	  in	  likeability	  ratings	  for	  the	  faces	  in	  Experiment	  3	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3c.	  A	  
repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  with	  rating	  time	  (pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐experiment)	  and	  cueing	  validity	  
of	  faces	  (valid	  and	  invalid)	  as	  within-­‐subjects	  factors	  found	  no	  overall	  effect	  of	  time	  
(F(1,23)=0.20,	  p=0.6551,	  η2G	  =0.00),	  or	  of	  cueing	  validity	  (F(1,23)=0.04,	  p=0.8371,	  η
2
G	  =0.00),	  
and	  no	  significant	  interaction	  between	  the	  two	  (F(1,23)=2.26,	  p=0.1467,	  η2G	  =0.03).	  
	   To	  explore	  the	  contrasts	  between	  Experiment	  1	  and	  3	  post-­‐hoc	  tests	  examining	  
the	  change	  in	  ratings	  for	  valid	  faces	  and	  invalid	  faces	  were	  examined.	  Due	  to	  violations	  of	  
the	  normality	  assumption,	  separate	  Mann-­‐Whitney	  U	  tests	  were	  performed	  on	  the	  data.	  	  
When	  examining	  the	  change	  in	  ratings	  (trust	  vs.	  liking)	  for	  invalid	  faces	  that	  consistently	  
looked	  away	  from	  targets	  showed	  a	  significantly	  greater	  decrease	  in	  trust	  ratings	  than	  
likeability	  ratings	  (U=166.5,	  p=0.0126),	  but	  no	  such	  differences	  between	  ratings	  emerged	  for	  
valid	  faces	  (U=267,	  p=0.6725).3	  
The	  results	  of	  Experiment	  3	  are	  quite	  surprising.	  This	  experiment	  was	  identical	  to	  
Experiment	  1	  except	  for	  one	  word	  change	  from	  “trustworthy”	  to	  “likeable”	  in	  the	  ratings	  
task.	  Although	  the	  RT	  gaze	  cueing	  effects	  were	  the	  same	  in	  Experiments	  1	  and	  3,	  this	  gaze	  
cueing	  had	  no	  effect	  on	  how	  likeable	  a	  person	  was	  perceived	  to	  be.	  It	  is	  somewhat	  
surprising	  that	  the	  predictability	  of	  gaze-­‐cueing	  can	  have	  such	  a	  specific	  effect,	  where	  
individuals	  who	  consistently	  look	  away	  from	  targets,	  a	  form	  of	  deception,	  are	  trusted	  less	  
but	  not	  necessarily	  liked	  less.	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Of	  course	  we	  have	  to	  be	  cautious	  when	  interpreting	  null	  results,	  and	  so	  in	  our	  
Supplementary	  Materials	  we	  include	  an	  additional	  version	  of	  this	  experiment	  (not	  included	  
here	  due	  to	  it	  also	  collecting	  data	  from	  EEG,	  which	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  compare	  with	  the	  
current	  package)	  using	  different	  faces	  and	  run	  on	  a	  different	  participant	  pool	  (this	  
experiment	  was	  conducted	  at	  Bangor	  University	  rather	  than	  the	  University	  of	  York).	  	  
Critically,	  this	  experiment	  also	  failed	  to	  detect	  any	  effect	  of	  gaze	  cueing	  contingencies	  on	  
judgements	  of	  likeability,	  whereas	  significant	  effects	  on	  judgements	  of	  trust	  have	  been	  
repeatedly	  observed.	  Faces	  used	  in	  the	  supplementary	  material	  were	  pre-­‐selected	  as	  
appearing	  high	  in	  happiness,	  which	  means	  they	  expressed	  slight	  smiles.	  Slight	  smiles	  are	  
effective	  at	  eliciting	  strong	  changes	  in	  trust	  (Manssuer	  et	  al.,	  2015a;	  b),	  and	  these	  are	  
comparable	  to	  the	  effect	  found	  in	  Experiment	  2	  with	  full	  smiles.	  	  That	  we	  see	  no	  learning	  of	  
liking	  with	  these	  slightly	  smiling	  faces	  leads	  us	  to	  have	  increased	  confidence	  in	  the	  lack	  of	  
incidental	  learning	  from	  eye-­‐gaze	  on	  judgments	  of	  liking.	  
Experiment	  4	  
A	  key	  feature	  of	  the	  previous	  research	  is	  that	  trust	  was	  influenced	  by	  eye-­‐gaze	  behaviour	  of	  
another	  person.	  Clearly	  looking	  towards	  or	  away	  from	  relevant	  objects	  is	  a	  means	  of	  
deceiving	  another	  person	  and	  initiates	  joint	  attention,	  which	  recruits	  reward-­‐related	  
neurocircuitry	  (Gordon,	  Eilbott,	  Feldman,	  Pelphrey	  &	  Vander	  Wyk,	  2013;	  Schilbach	  et	  al.,	  
2010).	  However,	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  this	  effect	  is	  wholly	  dependent	  on	  this	  joint	  
attention	  feature	  or	  if	  similar	  effects	  can	  be	  induced	  purely	  through	  selective	  disruptions	  of	  
visuomotor	  fluency	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  physical	  changes	  to	  the	  face.	  Previous	  research	  
has	  shown	  that	  perceptual	  fluency	  (e.g.,	  Reber	  et	  al.,	  1998)	  and	  motor	  fluency	  (e.g.,	  Hayes	  
et	  al.,	  2008)	  can	  influence	  emotional	  assessments	  of	  stimuli.	  Can	  impaired	  processing	  of	  a	  
face	  with	  no	  physical	  changes,	  such	  as	  eye-­‐gaze	  shifts,	  also	  influence	  trust	  judgements?	  To	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explore	  this,	  Experiment	  4	  reports	  a	  task-­‐switching	  paradigm	  designed	  to	  match	  the	  gaze-­‐
cueing	  paradigm,	  where	  participants	  experience	  the	  same	  disruptions	  of	  fluent	  processing	  
but	  without	  any	  sense	  of	  shared	  attention	  with	  the	  face.	  
A	  task-­‐switching	  paradigm	  involves	  participants	  performing	  two	  judgements	  of	  a	  
stimulus	  on	  different	  trials.	  	  For	  example,	  two	  trials	  might	  require	  the	  report	  of	  the	  colour	  of	  
a	  stimulus,	  while	  the	  next	  two	  trials	  might	  require	  the	  report	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  stimulus.	  	  
These	  paired	  trials	  and	  predictable	  switches	  between	  tasks	  continue	  throughout	  an	  
experiment.	  When	  the	  task	  changes,	  a	  visuomotor	  cost	  (slower	  RTs,	  greater	  probability	  of	  
errors)	  is	  associated	  with	  responses	  on	  that	  switch	  trial	  (e.g.,	  Monsell,	  2003;	  Wylie	  &	  Allport,	  
2000;	  Yeung,	  Nystrom,	  Aronson	  &	  Cohen,	  2006),	  even	  when	  the	  change	  sequence	  is	  
predictable	  and	  therefore	  switches	  can	  be	  anticipated	  (Kiesel	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Rogers	  &	  Monsell,	  
1995).	  As	  such,	  this	  experiment	  asks	  participants	  to	  make	  one	  of	  two	  judgements	  of	  face	  
images	  (colour	  or	  sex)	  where	  the	  designated	  task	  changes	  every	  other	  trial	  (a	  Switch-­‐Repeat	  
alternating	  runs	  paradigm).	  
	   It	  is	  hypothesised	  that	  if	  changing	  visuomotor	  fluency	  evokes	  affective	  reactions	  
(see	  Constable,	  Bayliss,	  Tipper	  &	  Kritikos,	  2013;	  Hayes	  et	  al.,	  2008)	  then	  creating	  disfluency	  
while	  processing	  a	  particular	  face	  identity	  will	  reduce	  trust	  ratings.	  That	  is,	  throughout	  the	  
experiment	  particular	  face	  identities	  are	  always	  presented	  on	  switch	  trials	  where	  RTs	  are	  
slowed	  and	  errors	  are	  more	  likely,	  while	  other	  face	  identities	  are	  always	  presented	  on	  
repeat	  trials	  where	  RTs	  are	  fast	  and	  accurate.	  Hence	  the	  design	  matches	  the	  gaze-­‐cueing	  
study	  of	  Experiment	  1	  where	  a	  particular	  face	  identity	  is	  always	  presented	  on	  a	  valid	  or	  
invalid	  cueing	  trial.	  However,	  if	  learning	  of	  trust	  is	  not	  simply	  based	  on	  visuomotor	  fluency,	  
but	  rather	  requires	  specific	  behaviour	  associated	  with	  deception	  such	  as	  eye-­‐gaze,	  then	  
simply	  impairing	  processing	  on	  switch	  trials	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  physical	  changes	  to	  the	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face	  will	  not	  change	  trust	  ratings.	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
32	  participants	  (29	  female,	  mean	  age	  20.97)	  volunteered	  for	  this	  study	  in	  return	  for	  course	  
credit	  or	  payment.	  8	  participants	  had	  to	  be	  removed	  after	  RT	  filters	  were	  applied,	  and	  so	  the	  
final	  number	  available	  for	  analysis	  was	  24.	  
Stimuli,	  Design	  and	  Procedure	  
Stimuli	  were	  generated	  from	  the	  same	  KDEF	  faces	  used	  in	  Experiment	  1.	  Participants	  
completed	  the	  same	  trustworthiness	  ratings	  as	  in	  Experiment	  1	  before	  and	  after	  the	  
experiment,	  using	  full	  colour	  unaltered	  images.	  During	  the	  main	  portion	  of	  the	  experiment,	  
however,	  the	  paradigm	  was	  changed	  from	  gaze-­‐cueing	  to	  task-­‐switching,	  and	  for	  this	  all	  face	  
images	  were	  superimposed	  with	  a	  transparent	  chromatic	  hue	  in	  Adobe	  Photoshop	  CS6	  to	  
appear	  either	  green	  or	  yellow	  (see	  Figure	  4	  for	  examples).	  As	  in	  Experiments	  1-­‐3,	  each	  face	  
appeared	  ten	  times	  across	  the	  experiment	  to	  each	  participant	  (twice	  in	  each	  block).	  
[Figure	  4	  approximately	  here]	  
	   Participants	  were	  told	  that	  they	  would	  be	  asked	  to	  make	  one	  of	  two	  judgements	  
about	  a	  face	  image	  that	  appeared	  on	  the	  screen;	  they	  would	  either	  be	  asked	  to	  judge	  the	  
colour	  of	  the	  image	  (Colour	  condition:	  green	  or	  yellow)	  or	  to	  judge	  the	  sex	  of	  the	  image	  
(Identity	  condition:	  male	  or	  female).	  Participants	  were	  told	  that	  the	  task	  they	  were	  to	  
perform	  would	  be	  shown	  to	  them	  as	  a	  reminder	  before	  each	  trial,	  but	  that	  the	  task	  would	  
change	  every	  other	  trial	  such	  that	  they	  would	  perform	  two	  Colour	  trials,	  then	  two	  Identity,	  
and	  so	  on.	  	  The	  act	  of	  switching	  between	  two	  tasks	  leads	  to	  responses	  on	  the	  first	  trial	  of	  the	  
new	  task	  being	  slower	  and	  more	  error	  prone;	  this	  switching	  cost	  to	  visuomotor	  fluency	  was	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the	  critical	  independent	  variable.	  As	  such,	  half	  of	  the	  identities	  only	  appeared	  immediately	  
after	  a	  task-­‐switch,	  in	  the	  first	  position	  of	  the	  sequence	  (Switch	  trial)	  and	  half	  appeared	  
immediately	  before	  the	  switch	  in	  the	  second	  position	  (Repeat	  trial).	  Identity	  and	  trial	  
position	  was	  counterbalanced	  across	  participants.	  
During	  the	  course	  of	  a	  trial,	  a	  condition	  cue	  (either	  ‘Colour’	  or	  ‘Identity’	  would	  
appear	  on	  the	  screen	  for	  1,000ms,	  alternating	  every	  two	  trials)	  to	  make	  participants	  aware	  
of	  the	  task	  they	  were	  performing,	  followed	  by	  a	  500ms	  fixation	  cross.	  The	  target	  image	  
would	  then	  appear	  on	  the	  screen	  for	  500ms	  subtending	  23.43˚	  visual	  angle	  horizontally	  and	  
22.62˚	  vertically,	  followed	  by	  a	  blank	  screen	  for	  1,000ms.	  Participants	  could	  respond	  at	  any	  
point	  in	  this	  1,500ms	  window,	  and	  any	  response	  after	  this	  time	  window	  was	  classed	  as	  
incorrect.	  Participant	  responses	  were	  the	  keyboard	  buttons	  Z	  and	  M,	  each	  of	  which	  
corresponded	  to	  a	  different	  answer	  in	  the	  two	  tasks	  (i.e.	  Z,	  male	  and	  green;	  M,	  female	  and	  
yellow	  −	  counterbalanced	  across	  participants).	  
The	  same	  RT	  filters	  were	  applied	  to	  the	  data	  as	  in	  Experiments	  1,	  2	  and	  3	  with	  the	  
difference	  that	  the	  2,500ms	  upper	  limit	  was	  shortened	  to	  1,500ms	  to	  reflect	  the	  timings	  of	  
the	  experiment.	  Incorrect	  responses	  and	  responses	  faster	  than	  250ms	  were	  removed	  from	  
the	  data	  and	  the	  participants’	  accuracy	  and	  number	  of	  trials	  were	  considered	  to	  see	  if	  they	  
retained	  more	  than	  70%	  of	  their	  original	  number	  of	  trials.	  This	  paradigm	  proved	  to	  be	  more	  
difficult	  for	  participants	  than	  gaze-­‐cueing,	  as	  8	  participants	  committed	  too	  many	  errors	  to	  
be	  suitable	  for	  inclusion.	  
RT	  and	  accuracy	  rates	  were	  calculated	  for	  each	  participant	  for	  both	  Switch	  and	  
Repeat	  trials	  in	  each	  of	  the	  five	  blocks,	  and	  these	  were	  compared	  in	  separate	  2x5	  repeated	  
measures	  ANOVAs.	  Trustworthiness	  ratings	  were	  calculated	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  in	  
Experiment	  1	  with	  Switch/Repeat	  replacing	  invalid/valid	  as	  the	  independent	  measure	  and	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these	  were	  analysed	  in	  a	  2	  (pre/post-­‐experiment)	  x	  2	  (Switch/Repeat)	  repeated	  measures	  
ANOVA.	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  
Task-­‐Switching	  
The	  results	  of	  Experiment	  4	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2d.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  five	  blocks,	  RTs	  
were	  faster	  to	  Repeat	  than	  Switch	  trials.	  A	  2x5	  ANOVA	  found	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  trial	  
(F(1,23)=27.03,	  p<0.0001,	  η2G	  =0.05)	  and	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  block	  (GG	  corrected:	  




A	  2x5	  ANOVA	  on	  accuracy	  rates	  (see	  Table	  1)	  found	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  trial	  
(F(1,23)=17.58,	  p=0.0003,	  η2G	  =	  0.05)	  with	  more	  errors	  on	  Switch	  trials	  that	  Repeat	  trials	  and	  
a	  main	  effect	  of	  block	  (GG	  corrected:	  F(2.58,59.39)=9.33,	  p<0.0001,	  η2G	  =	  0.22)	  but	  no	  
interaction	  (F(4,92)=1.39,	  p=0.2430,	  η2G	  =0.00).	  
Trustworthiness	  Ratings	  
The	  changes	  in	  trustworthiness	  ratings	  for	  the	  faces	  in	  Experiment	  4	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3d.	  	  
A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  with	  rating	  time	  (pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐experiment)	  and	  position	  of	  
face	  in	  the	  task	  sequence	  (Switch	  and	  Repeat)	  as	  within-­‐subjects	  factors	  found	  a	  significant	  
effect	  of	  time	  with	  more	  positive	  trustworthiness	  ratings	  after	  the	  experiment	  than	  before	  
(F(1,23)=5.02,	  p=0.0351,	  η2G	  =0.13),	  but	  none	  of	  face	  position	  (F(1,23)=0.42,	  p=0.5213,	  η
2
G	  
=0.00),	  and	  no	  interaction	  between	  the	  two	  (F(1,23)=1.31,	  p=0.2636,	  η2G	  =0.00).	  
These	  results	  suggest	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  physical	  changes	  to	  the	  face	  that	  led	  
to	  the	  initiation	  of	  joint	  attention	  with	  participants,	  the	  change	  in	  trustworthiness	  
judgements	  was	  not	  replicated.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  trust	  effect	  cannot	  be	  explained	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purely	  by	  disruptions	  of	  visuomotor	  fluency.	  
Experiment	  5	  
Experiment	  4	  shows	  that	  disruptions	  to	  visuomotor	  fluency	  using	  a	  task-­‐switching	  paradigm	  
are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  change	  judgements	  of	  trustworthiness.	  However,	  there	  were	  a	  number	  
of	  methodological	  changes	  between	  Experiment	  1	  and	  Experiment	  4,	  not	  least	  of	  which	  was	  
that	  the	  latter	  made	  the	  faces	  targets	  of	  participants’	  judgements,	  rather	  than	  distractors	  
(we	  thank	  a	  reviewer	  for	  highlighting	  this).	  Literature	  on	  distractor	  devaluation	  suggests	  that	  
to-­‐be-­‐ignored	  information	  often	  shows	  a	  devaluation	  that	  to-­‐be-­‐attended	  information	  does	  
not	  (see	  Raymond,	  2009).	  It	  could	  be	  that	  we	  do	  not	  see	  any	  learning	  of	  trust	  (particularly	  
the	  characteristic	  decrease	  for	  invalid	  faces	  evident	  in	  Experiments	  1	  and	  2)	  in	  Experiment	  4	  
because	  it	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  devalue	  targets	  than	  distractors.	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  a	  similar	  
task-­‐switching	  experiment	  to	  Experiment	  4,	  but	  where	  faces	  are	  presented	  as	  background	  
distractors,	  as	  in	  Experiments	  1-­‐3,	  might	  result	  in	  similar	  incidental	  learning	  patterns	  to	  
those	  in	  Experiments	  1-­‐3.	  Experiment	  5	  explores	  this	  and	  adapts	  the	  task-­‐switching	  
paradigm	  of	  Experiment	  4	  to	  more	  closely	  match	  the	  object-­‐categorisation	  task	  that	  
participants	  completed	  in	  Experiments	  1-­‐3.	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
28	  participants	  (20	  female,	  mean	  age	  19.07)	  volunteered	  for	  this	  study	  in	  return	  for	  a	  
mixture	  of	  course	  credit	  and	  payment.	  4	  participants	  had	  to	  be	  removed	  after	  RT	  filters	  
were	  applied,	  and	  so	  the	  final	  number	  available	  for	  analysis	  was	  24.	  
	  
Stimuli,	  Design	  and	  Procedure	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[Figure	  5	  approximately	  here]	  
This	  experiment	  closely	  matched	  the	  gaze-­‐cueing	  experiment	  used	  in	  Experiment	  1,	  but	  the	  
faces	  no	  longer	  shifted	  their	  gaze.	  Instead,	  participants	  were	  told	  that	  they	  would	  be	  making	  
one	  of	  two	  possible	  judgements	  on	  a	  given	  trial;	  the	  first	  was	  object	  TYPE,	  where	  they	  would	  
categorise	  the	  object	  as	  either	  a	  kitchen	  or	  garage	  item	  (as	  in	  other	  experiments),	  while	  the	  
second	  was	  object	  COLOUR,	  where	  they	  would	  judge	  whether	  the	  object	  was	  blue	  or	  yellow.	  	  
Changes	  to	  the	  stimuli	  from	  previous	  experiments	  were	  the	  introduction	  of	  yellow-­‐
coloured	  objects	  (the	  same	  objects	  as	  used	  in	  previous	  experiments	  but	  digitally	  
manipulated	  to	  appear	  yellow	  instead	  of	  blue)	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  when	  faces	  appeared	  in	  the	  
centre	  of	  the	  screen	  we	  used	  unaltered,	  neutral	  images	  rather	  than	  those	  digitally	  
manipulated	  to	  shift	  their	  gaze.	  We	  also	  introduced	  a	  task	  cue	  before	  each	  trial,	  to	  remind	  
participants	  of	  whether	  they	  were	  supposed	  to	  judge	  the	  object's	  TYPE	  (kitchen/garage)	  or	  
COLOUR	  (blue/yellow;	  see	  Figure	  5).	  	  
The	  task	  that	  participants	  completed	  altered	  every	  other	  trial	  in	  a	  Switch/Repeat	  
task-­‐switching	  procedure,	  as	  in	  Experiment	  4,	  with	  each	  face	  presented	  ten	  times	  over	  the	  
course	  of	  the	  experiment	  (twice	  in	  each	  of	  the	  five	  blocks),	  and	  a	  feedback	  tone	  was	  
presented	  for	  incorrect	  responses.	  Participants	  were	  once	  again	  instructed	  to	  ignore	  the	  
faces	  as	  irrelevant.	  Participants	  completed	  trustworthiness	  ratings	  both	  at	  the	  beginning	  
and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  
Task-­‐Switching	  
The	  results	  of	  Experiment	  5	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2e.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  five	  blocks,	  RTs	  
were	  faster	  to	  Repeat	  than	  Switch	  trials.	  A	  2x5	  ANOVA	  found	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  trial	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(F(1,23)=37.92,	  p<0.0001,	  η2G	  =0.06)	  but	  no	  main	  effect	  of	  block	  (GG	  corrected:	  
F(2.53,58.10=0.51,	  p=0.7270,	  η2G	  =0.01)	  and	  no	  interaction	  (GG	  corrected:	  
F(2.90,66.77)=0.25,	  p=0.9079,	  η2G	  =0.00).	  
A	  2x5	  ANOVA	  on	  accuracy	  rates	  (see	  Table	  1)	  found	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  block	  (GG	  
corrected:	  F(3.12,71.67)=3.34,	  p=0.0225,	  η2G	  =0.06),	  as	  well	  as	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  trial	  
(F(1,23)=49.56,	  p<0.0001,	  η2G	  =0.07)	  but	  no	  interaction	  between	  the	  two	  (F(4,92)=0.79,	  
p=0.5330,	  η2G	  =0.01).	  
Trustworthiness	  Ratings	  
The	  changes	  in	  trustworthiness	  ratings	  for	  the	  faces	  in	  Experiment	  4	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3e.	  	  
A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  with	  rating	  time	  (pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐experiment)	  and	  position	  of	  
face	  in	  the	  task	  sequence	  (Switch	  and	  Repeat)	  as	  within-­‐subjects	  factors	  found	  an	  effect	  of	  
face	  position	  (F(1,23)=	  5.74,	  p=0.0251,	  η2G	  =0.07),	  but	  found	  no	  significant	  effect	  of	  time	  in	  
this	  experiment	  (F(1,23)=0.69,	  p=0.4132,	  η2G	  =0.01)	  and	  no	  interaction	  between	  the	  two	  
(F(1,23)=0.18,	  p=0.6718,	  η2G	  =0.00).	  
	   To	  explore	  the	  contrasts	  between	  Experiment	  1	  and	  5	  we	  examined	  the	  changes	  
in	  ratings	  for	  valid	  faces	  and	  invalid	  faces	  separately.	  In	  this	  contrast	  the	  assumption	  of	  
normality	  was	  not	  violated,	  and	  so	  independent	  t-­‐tests	  were	  used.	  	  When	  examining	  the	  
change	  in	  trustworthiness	  ratings	  for	  low-­‐fluency	  faces	  (Switch	  and	  invalid	  faces)	  there	  was	  
a	  significantly	  greater	  decrease	  in	  trust	  ratings	  during	  gaze	  cueing	  than	  task	  switching	  
(t(46)=-­‐3.70,	  p=0.0006),	  but	  no	  such	  difference	  emerged	  for	  valid	  faces	  (t(46)=-­‐0.50,	  
p=0.6218).4	  
Although	  the	  results	  of	  Experiment	  5	  do	  show	  a	  significant	  effect	  of	  face	  position,	  
this	  appears	  to	  be	  due	  to	  chance	  differences	  in	  the	  pre-­‐ratings	  –	  there	  is	  no	  logical	  reason	  to	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suppose	  that	  visuomotor	  fluency	  could	  have	  an	  effect	  before	  participants	  encounter	  it,	  and	  
so	  these	  differences	  must	  be	  due	  to	  random	  chance.	  The	  fact	  that	  they	  do	  not	  change	  over	  
the	  course	  of	  the	  experiment,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  interaction	  and	  the	  remarkably	  
flat	  profile	  of	  changes,	  is	  evidence	  that	  this	  incidental	  learning	  cannot	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  
of	  visuomotor	  fluency	  –	  even	  when	  accounting	  for	  whether	  the	  faces	  are	  targets	  or	  
distractors.	  	  
However,	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  effect	  of	  time	  in	  this	  experiment	  suggests	  that	  the	  overall	  
increase	  in	  trustworthiness	  seen	  in	  Experiment	  4	  may	  indeed	  have	  been	  due	  to	  the	  faces’	  
status	  as	  target	  rather	  than	  distractor	  stimuli,	  and	  reflect	  a	  familiarity	  effect	  that	  is	  not	  
evident	  here.	  	  
	  
General	  Discussion	  
Detecting	  and	  learning	  about	  subtle	  cues	  to	  trustworthiness	  is	  of	  critical	  importance	  during	  
social	  interactions.	  One	  such	  cue	  is	  the	  eye-­‐gaze	  pattern	  of	  another	  individual,	  whether	  they	  
are	  reliable	  and	  look	  towards	  relevant	  objects	  in	  a	  scene	  or	  deceive	  by	  looking	  away	  from	  
objects.	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  RT	  results	  of	  the	  first	  three	  experiments,	  gaze-­‐cues	  are	  encoded	  
rapidly	  and	  automatically	  and	  hence	  are	  effective	  ways	  of	  misdirecting	  others,	  as	  shifts	  of	  
attention	  are	  difficult	  to	  inhibit.	  A	  series	  of	  experiments	  have	  further	  investigated	  the	  
boundary	  conditions	  of	  the	  learning	  of	  trust	  from	  patterns	  of	  eye	  gaze.	  
Experiment	  1	  demonstrated	  that	  learning	  of	  trust	  is	  possible	  even	  when	  faces	  
express	  neutral	  emotions.	  Previous	  work	  highlighted	  the	  role	  of	  emotion	  in	  these	  gaze-­‐trust	  
effects.	  Bayliss	  et	  al.,	  (2009)	  demonstrated	  significant	  trust	  learning	  effects	  when	  faces	  
smiled,	  no	  effects	  when	  they	  frowned,	  and	  marginal	  effects	  when	  the	  faces	  were	  neutral.	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Experiment	  1	  has	  revealed	  that	  significant	  trust	  effects	  can	  be	  obtained	  with	  neutral	  faces.	  It	  
is	  unclear	  whether	  the	  failure	  to	  detect	  effects	  in	  the	  Bayliss	  et	  al.	  study	  was	  a	  Type	  I	  error,	  
or	  whether	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  procedure	  were	  of	  critical	  importance.	  In	  the	  previous	  work	  a	  
two	  alternative	  forced	  choice	  (2AFC)	  task	  was	  employed	  where	  pairs	  of	  faces	  that	  had	  
consistently	  looked	  towards	  targets	  (valid)	  or	  had	  looked	  away	  from	  targets	  (invalid),	  were	  
presented	  and	  participants	  selected	  the	  one	  who	  they	  felt	  was	  more	  trustworthy.	  In	  
contrast,	  the	  current	  study	  requires	  assessment	  of	  trust	  for	  each	  individual	  face	  and	  it	  
measures	  changes	  in	  trust	  ratings	  from	  the	  start	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  
We	  feel	  this	  new	  approach	  is	  a	  more	  sensitive	  and	  robust	  means	  of	  measuring	  trust.	  
Furthermore	  it	  provides	  important	  information	  concerning	  where	  the	  effect	  may	  lie.	  That	  is,	  
2AFC	  can	  only	  reveal	  that	  faces	  that	  previously	  looked	  towards	  targets	  tend	  to	  be	  selected	  
as	  more	  trustworthy,	  not	  whether	  valid	  faces	  are	  trusted	  more,	  invalid	  faces	  trusted	  less,	  or	  
both.	  The	  results	  of	  Experiment	  1	  suggest	  an	  asymmetry,	  where	  the	  effect	  is	  only	  observed	  
in	  the	  decline	  in	  trust	  of	  invalid	  faces	  that	  looked	  away	  from	  targets,	  whereas	  there	  is	  no	  
change	  in	  trust	  rating	  for	  the	  valid	  faces	  that	  always	  looked	  towards	  targets.	  
That	  this	  effect	  initially	  manifests	  as	  a	  decrease	  in	  trust	  only	  for	  invalid	  faces	  may	  
relate	  to	  the	  finding	  by	  both	  Bayliss	  and	  Tipper	  (2006)	  and	  Bayliss	  et	  al.,	  (2009)	  of	  a	  memory	  
bias	  for	  invalid	  faces.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  false	  belief	  that	  invalid	  faces	  appeared	  more	  frequently	  
than	  valid	  faces	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  gaze-­‐cueing	  experiment.	  This	  builds	  on	  other	  work	  
showing	  memory	  advantages	  for	  cheaters	  (Bell	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Buchner,	  Bell,	  Mehl	  &	  Musch,	  
2009),	  and	  suggests	  that	  the	  motivation	  behind	  this	  trust	  effect	  is	  to	  remember	  those	  faces	  
that	  frequently	  present	  challenges	  to	  visuomotor	  fluency	  –	  therefore	  there	  is	  less	  change	  in	  
trust	  for	  valid	  faces	  simply	  because	  participants	  are	  not	  motivated	  to	  remember	  those	  
identities	  as	  clearly.	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The	  second	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  was	  to	  explore	  the	  role	  that	  emotion	  plays	  at	  initial	  
encoding.	  Experiment	  2	  demonstrates	  that	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  change	  in	  the	  pattern	  of	  
trust	  learning	  when	  the	  faces	  smile;	  that	  is,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Experiment	  1	  where	  effects	  were	  
only	  detected	  in	  a	  decline	  in	  trust	  for	  invalid	  faces.	  When	  the	  faces	  smile	  a	  bi-­‐directional	  
effect	  is	  observed,	  where	  invalid	  faces	  again	  show	  a	  decrease	  in	  trust,	  while	  valid	  faces	  now	  
produce	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  trust.	  This	  latter	  bi-­‐directional	  effect	  with	  smiling	  faces	  has	  
also	  been	  demonstrated	  by	  Manssuer	  et	  al.	  (2015a,b).	  
There	  are	  multiple	  potential	  explanations	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  pattern	  of	  results	  
between	  Experiments	  1	  and	  2	  that	  future	  research	  should	  investigate.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  
default	  learning	  mechanism	  might	  be	  to	  detect	  deception.	  Certainly	  in	  terms	  of	  memory	  for	  
faces,	  this	  is	  better	  for	  faces	  that	  deceive	  (Bayliss	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Bayliss	  &	  Tipper,	  2006;	  Bell	  et	  
al.,	  2012;	  Buchner	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  hence	  learning	  of	  trust	  is	  only	  evident	  in	  invalid	  faces	  that	  
deceive	  and	  look	  away	  from	  targets.	  	  In	  contrast,	  when	  the	  faces	  all	  express	  positive	  
emotion,	  this	  combines	  with	  the	  positive	  signal	  of	  joint	  attention	  evoked	  by	  valid	  cueing	  
faces,	  hence	  increasing	  trust	  of	  these	  faces.	  	  Alternatively,	  the	  positive	  social	  context	  
motivates	  participants	  to	  remember	  the	  faces	  in	  the	  experiment.	  As	  invalid	  faces	  are	  
apparently	  remembered	  well	  regardless	  of	  emotion	  (given	  the	  similar	  trust	  change	  profile	  
for	  invalid	  faces	  across	  Experiments	  1	  and	  2),	  this	  seems	  to	  primarily	  affect	  valid	  faces.	  
	   The	  aim	  of	  the	  second	  half	  of	  this	  paper	  was	  to	  explore	  some	  of	  the	  boundary	  
conditions	  of	  this	  effect.	  Experiment	  3	  replaced	  the	  question	  of	  trustworthiness	  that	  
participants	  were	  asked	  with	  a	  question	  of	  likeability;	  simply	  by	  changing	  a	  single	  word	  in	  
the	  design	  the	  effect	  was	  abolished.	  The	  lack	  of	  an	  effect	  when	  judging	  liking	  is	  somewhat	  
counterintuitive.	  	  Therefore	  it	  was	  of	  value	  to	  report	  a	  further	  experiment	  in	  the	  
supplementary	  materials.	  	  This	  study	  had	  a	  number	  of	  procedural	  differences	  to	  Experiment	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3,	  the	  most	  important	  of	  which	  was	  that	  the	  faces	  expressed	  positive	  emotions	  (slight	  
smiles).	  	  This	  situation	  is	  closer	  to	  Experiment	  2	  where	  positive	  smiles	  were	  observed,	  and	  
again	  failed	  to	  show	  any	  effects	  when	  assessing	  liking	  of	  another	  person.	  Hence	  we	  doubt	  
this	  is	  a	  Type	  2	  error.	  
This	  lack	  of	  effect	  with	  liking	  judgements	  suggests	  that	  the	  gaze-­‐contingent	  trust	  
effect	  is	  highly	  specific	  to	  trust	  −	  a	  fact	  that	  makes	  sense	  if	  one	  considers	  that	  trust	  as	  a	  trait	  
judgement	  serves	  much	  more	  heavily	  as	  a	  predictive	  model	  of	  behaviour	  than	  does	  liking:	  
we	  decide	  how	  much	  to	  trust	  someone	  based	  on	  how	  we	  expect	  them	  to	  behave,	  whereas	  
liking	  is	  a	  more	  subjective	  and	  affective	  judgement,	  and	  one	  less	  based	  in	  statistical	  
contingencies.	  For	  example,	  incidental	  learning	  of	  gaze	  contingencies	  will	  influence	  
economic	  decisions	  to	  invest	  in	  another	  person	  (e.g.,	  Rogers	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  if	  
we	  manipulated	  participants’	  beliefs	  about	  intentions	  or	  sense	  of	  competition	  that	  an	  effect	  
of	  liking	  would	  emerge,	  but	  at	  its	  basic	  level	  this	  effect	  appears	  to	  be	  specific	  to	  monitoring	  
the	  trustworthiness	  of	  interactants.	  	  To	  our	  knowledge	  this	  provides	  the	  first	  evidence	  of	  a	  
functional	  distinction	  between	  trust	  and	  liking,	  and	  directions	  for	  future	  research	  may	  
examine	  other	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  two	  differ,	  and	  the	  possible	  mechanisms	  underlying	  
each	  of	  them.	  
It	  is	  now	  well	  established	  that	  the	  eye	  movements	  of	  another	  person	  automatically	  
shift	  attention	  and	  whether	  they	  consistently	  look	  towards	  or	  away	  from	  objects	  mediates	  
incidental	  learning	  of	  trust.	  	  The	  shifts	  of	  attention	  of	  another	  person	  certainly	  can	  be	  used	  
to	  deceive,	  and	  hence	  it	  might	  be	  predicted	  that	  if	  there	  are	  no	  such	  behaviours	  in	  a	  face,	  
then	  learning	  of	  trust	  does	  not	  take	  place,	  even	  though	  particular	  face	  identities	  are	  
associated	  with	  different	  levels	  of	  visuomotor	  fluency.	  	  Therefore	  Experiments	  4	  and	  5	  
examined	  whether	  learning	  of	  trust	  could	  be	  generated	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  physical	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changes	  to	  the	  faces	  through	  a	  task	  switching	  procedure.	  We	  found	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
any	  physical	  changes,	  disruptions	  to	  participants’	  sense	  of	  visuomotor	  fluency	  were	  not	  
sufficient	  to	  generate	  changes	  in	  trustworthiness,	  despite	  the	  RT	  costs	  associated	  with	  task-­‐
switching	  being	  comparable	  to	  those	  associated	  with	  gaze-­‐cueing	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  This	  finding	  
also	  held	  true	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  faces	  were	  targets	  (Experiment	  4)	  or	  distractors	  
(Experiment	  5).	  	  
This	  contrasts	  with	  previous	  work	  that	  has	  shown	  that	  perceptual	  fluency	  does	  
increase	  liking	  of	  objects	  (e.g.	  Reber	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  Zajonc,	  1968).	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  
this	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  faces	  being	  more	  resilient	  to	  devaluation	  in	  Experiment	  4,	  as	  
Experiment	  5	  uses	  the	  same	  faces	  as	  distractors	  that	  appear	  before	  the	  target	  object.	  Taken	  
together,	  these	  two	  results	  provide	  strong	  evidence	  against	  disruptions	  to	  visuomotor	  
fluency	  being	  sufficient	  for	  incidental	  learning	  of	  trust.	  	  
There	  is	  also	  previous	  literature	  that	  does	  report	  that	  processing	  fluency	  can	  affect	  
judgements	  of	  trust.	  For	  example,	  Winkielman,	  Olszanowski	  and	  Gola	  (2015)	  found	  that	  
increasing	  the	  disfluency	  associated	  with	  certain	  faces	  in	  an	  emotion	  categorisation	  
procedure	  led	  to	  decreased	  ratings	  of	  trust	  in	  later	  judgements,	  and	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  
disfluency	  was	  unrelated	  to	  face	  valence.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  our	  
experiments	  examine	  learning	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  physical	  cues	  to	  trustworthiness	  (such	  as	  
changes	  in	  expression)	  and	  as	  such	  these	  results	  are	  not	  necessarily	  inconsistent	  with	  this	  
previous	  literature.	  Our	  interpretation	  fits	  with	  our	  earlier	  point	  that	  this	  incidentally	  
learned	  trust	  reflects	  a	  sense	  of	  reliability	  (or	  unreliability)	  rather	  than	  variations	  along	  a	  
dimension	  of	  warmth.	  	  
Learning	  of	  trust	  from	  patterns	  of	  eye-­‐gaze	  is	  probably	  effective	  because	  joint	  
attention	  can	  be	  positively	  reinforcing	  (Schilbach	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  and	  because	  gaze	  direction	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can	  be	  used	  by	  primates	  and	  humans	  to	  misdirect	  the	  attention	  of	  others	  (e.g.	  Klein,	  
Shepherd	  &	  Platt,	  2009).	  Hence	  the	  invalid	  gaze-­‐cue	  when	  the	  face	  looks	  away	  from	  the	  
highly	  salient	  target	  will	  be	  perceived	  as	  an	  act	  of	  deception.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  static	  faces	  in	  
the	  task	  switching	  procedure	  of	  Experiments	  4	  and	  5	  do	  not	  provide	  such	  socially	  relevant	  
information	  (see	  also	  Manssuer	  et	  al,	  2015a,	  b).	  	  	  However,	  we	  note	  that	  some	  other	  
procedures	  might	  be	  able	  to	  influence	  trust	  judgements.	  	  For	  example,	  Fenske,	  Raymond,	  
Kessler,	  Westoby	  &	  Tipper	  (2005)	  demonstrated	  that	  response	  inhibition	  associated	  with	  a	  
face	  reduced	  ratings	  of	  trust.	  	  Hence	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  visuomotor	  fluency	  is	  not	  
sufficient	  to	  produce	  changes	  in	  trust,	  but	  we	  are	  yet	  to	  identify	  other	  processes	  that	  might	  
influence	  trust	  ratings.	  
A	  final	  point	  to	  be	  addressed	  concerns	  the	  question	  of	  how	  much	  these	  results	  may	  
be	  due	  to	  demand	  characteristics.	  After	  concluding	  the	  experiment	  several	  participants	  
were	  able	  to	  deduce	  the	  aims	  when	  prompted,	  but	  few	  had	  spontaneous	  or	  confident	  
answers.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  mere	  act	  of	  enquiring	  about	  their	  beliefs	  may	  have	  triggered	  a	  
reassessment	  of	  the	  experiment,	  developing	  their	  answer	  as	  a	  sensible	  explanation	  without	  
previously	  considering	  it.	  This	  seems	  particularly	  likely	  given	  that	  Experiment	  3	  was	  as	  clear	  
to	  interpret	  as	  Experiments	  1	  and	  2,	  and	  yet	  showed	  no	  evidence	  of	  incidental	  learning	  in	  
the	  likeability	  ratings.	  However,	  we	  are	  not	  making	  strong	  claims	  concerning	  conscious	  
awareness	  of	  learning.	  Rather,	  our	  learning	  task	  is	  incidental	  in	  that	  the	  faces	  were	  
irrelelvant	  to	  a	  participant’s	  somewhat	  demanding	  main	  goal	  of	  identifying	  peripheral	  
objects.	  
In	  sum,	  the	  experiments	  presented	  here	  replicate	  and	  support	  previous	  findings	  
showing	  that	  participants	  learn	  incidentally	  presented	  identity-­‐gaze	  contingencies,	  and	  use	  
them	  to	  inform	  subsequent	  trust	  judgements.	  We	  found	  that	  with	  faces	  expressing	  a	  neutral	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emotion,	  this	  trust	  effect	  was	  driven	  primarily	  by	  a	  decrease	  in	  trust	  for	  invalid-­‐cueing	  faces,	  
which	  perhaps	  reflects	  enhanced	  memory	  for	  individuals	  who	  deceive.	  In	  contrast,	  when	  
faces	  express	  positive	  emotions	  learning	  of	  trust	  for	  valid	  faces	  emerges.	  We	  also	  found	  that	  
the	  effect	  is	  specific	  to	  judgements	  of	  trust	  and	  does	  not	  generalise	  to	  other	  judgements,	  
such	  as	  liking.	  Finally,	  reducing	  visuomotor	  fluency	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  influence	  ratings	  of	  
trust;	  physical	  changes	  to	  the	  face	  such	  as	  gaze	  shifts	  that	  encourage	  or	  disrupt	  feelings	  of	  
joint	  attention	  and	  deception	  play	  a	  role.	  Taken	  together,	  these	  experiments	  have	  further	  
specified	  the	  properties	  of	  the	  incidental	  trust	  learning	  system.	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Footnotes	  
1. Although	  means	  and	  standard	  deviations	  were	  not	  retrieved	  from	  Oosterhof	  &	  
Todorov’s	  (2008)	  material,	  we	  can	  validate	  our	  assumption	  that	  these	  groups	  of	  
faces	  were	  close	  to	  neutral	  by	  examining	  the	  pre-­‐ratings	  assigned	  to	  them	  in	  the	  
five	  experiments	  presented	  here.	  As	  the	  pre-­‐ratings	  occurred	  before	  any	  
participants	  had	  a	  chance	  to	  experience	  the	  faces	  within	  an	  experimental	  context,	  
any	  differences	  could	  only	  be	  explained	  by	  physical	  cues	  to	  trustworthiness,	  and	  the	  
combined	  power	  of	  these	  five	  experiments	  would	  be	  sufficient	  to	  detect	  this.	  We	  
explored	  this	  and	  found	  that	  the	  pre-­‐ratings	  for	  faces	  in	  one	  group	  (M=-­‐2.71,	  
s.d.=13.04)	  did	  not	  significantly	  differ	  from	  the	  other	  (M=0.85,	  s.d.=6.82;	  t(14)=-­‐
0.68,	  p=0.5055).	  
2. For	  the	  sake	  of	  completeness	  we	  also	  compared	  the	  results	  of	  Experiments	  1	  and	  2	  
in	  a	  mixed	  2	  (cueing	  validity;	  within)	  x2	  (experiment;	  between)	  ANOVA,	  with	  change	  
in	  trustworthiness	  (calculated	  as	  pre-­‐experiment	  ratings	  subtracted	  from	  post-­‐
experiment	  ratings)	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  and	  with	  planned	  contrasts	  between	  
valid	  and	  invalid	  faces	  across	  experiments.	  We	  found	  a	  significant	  overall	  effect	  of	  
validity	  (F(1,46)=19.21,	  p=0.0001,	  η2G	  =0.14)	  but	  none	  of	  experiment	  (F(1,46)=1.56,	  
p=0.2182,	  η2G	  =0.02)	  and	  no	  interaction	  between	  the	  two	  (F(1,46)=0.77,	  p=0.3860,	  
η
2
G	  =0.01).	  Planned	  comparisons	  found	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  neutral	  and	  
smiling	  valid	  faces	  approached	  significance	  (p=0.0791),	  but	  there	  was	  no	  such	  
difference	  between	  neutral	  and	  smiling	  invalid	  faces	  (p=0.6235).	  	  
3. Comparing	  Experiments	  1	  and	  3	  with	  a	  2x2	  mixed	  ANOVA	  found	  a	  significant	  overall	  
effect	  of	  validity	  (F(1,46)=9.44,	  p=0.0040,	  η2G	  =0.10)	  as	  well	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  
experiment	  (F(1,46)=4.94,	  p=0.0312,	  η2G	  =0.05)	  but	  no	  interaction	  between	  the	  two	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(F(1,46)=2.35,	  p=0.1322,	  η2G	  =0.03).	  Planned	  comparisons	  showed	  the	  difference	  
between	  trustworthiness	  and	  likeability	  ratings	  was	  significant	  for	  invalid	  faces	  
(p<0.0001)	  but	  not	  for	  invalid	  faces	  (p=0.5020).	  
4. Comparing	  Experiments	  1	  and	  5	  in	  a	  2x2	  mixed	  ANOVA	  found	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  
fluency	  (high	  –	  valid	  or	  repeat;	  low	  –	  invalid	  or	  switch;	  F(1,46)=6.72,	  p=0.0127,	  η2G	  
=0.07)	  as	  well	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  experiment	  (F(1,46)=8.02,	  p=0.0068,	  η2G	  =0.08)	  and	  a	  
significant	  interaction	  between	  the	  two	  (F(1,46)=4.88,	  p=0.0322,	  η2G	  =0.05).	  
Planned	  comparisons	  showed	  that	  high	  fluency	  (valid	  and	  Repeat)	  faces	  did	  not	  
differ	  significantly	  between	  the	  gaze-­‐cueing	  and	  task-­‐switching	  paradigms	  
(p=0.5090),	  but	  there	  was	  a	  highly	  significant	  difference	  between	  low-­‐fluency	  
(invalid	  and	  Switch)	  faces	  (p<0.0001).	  We	  do	  not	  include	  a	  similar	  analysis	  for	  
Experiment	  4	  as	  this	  was	  much	  more	  methodologically	  distinct	  from	  Experiment	  1	  
and	  so	  such	  comparison	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  interpret.	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Table	   1.	   Accuracy	   rates	   (%	   correct)	   in	   response	   to	   valid/Repeat	   and	   invalid/Switch	   faces	  
across	  five	  blocks	  in	  Experiments	  1-­‐4.	  
Experiment	   Trial	   Block	  1	   Block	  2	   Block	  3	   Block	  4	   Block	  5	  
1	   Valid	   84.90	   86.20	   90.63	   91.67	   93.50	  
	   Invalid	   85.42	   88.54	   89.84	   90.89	   90.10	  
2	   Valid	   90.89	   89.06	   95.31	   90.10	   95.31	  
	   Invalid	   90.36	   90.10	   94.53	   93.23	   93.75	  
3	   Valid	   91.93	   89.84	   95.83	   92.71	   92.19	  
	   Invalid	   88.02	   88.80	   93.23	   92.45	   95.05	  
4	   Repeat	   71.09	   86.46	   88.02	   86.46	   90.63	  
	   Switch	   67.45	   83.33	   83.85	   81.51	   89.84	  
5	   Repeat	   93.49	   97.14	   96.61	   97.92	   97.14	  
	   Switch	   91.15	   91.67	   93.75	   95.31	   94.53	  
	  
	   	  




Figure	  1.	  Outline	  of	  gaze-­‐cueing	  procedure	  used	  in	  Experiments	  1-­‐3.	  (a)	  Examples	  of	  a	  single	  
face	  on	  a	  valid	  (left)	  and	  invalid	  (right)	  trial.	  A	  participant	  would	  see	  this	  face	  in	  only	  one	  of	  
the	  two	  conditions.	  (b)	  The	  trial	  sequence	  of	  the	  whole	  experiment.	  Participants	  made	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ratings	  of	  the	  faces	  (trustworthiness	  in	  Experiments	  1	  and	  2,	  shown,	  likeability	  ratings	  in	  
Experiment	  3)	  at	  the	  beginning	  (top)	  and	  end	  (bottom)	  of	  the	  experiment,	  and	  in	  the	  main	  
body	  participants	  categorized	  the	  kitchen	  and	  garage	  objects	  with	  key-­‐press	  responses	  
while	  ignoring	  the	  faces.	  	  
	  
	   	  




Figure	  2.	  Line	  graphs	  tracking	  changes	  in	  reaction	  times	  (RT;	  ms)	  across	  five	  blocks	  in	  
response	  to	  valid	  (dotted	  line)	  and	  invalid	  (solid	  line)	  trials	  for	  (a)	  Experiment	  1,	  (b)	  
Experiment	  2,	  (c)	  Experiment	  3,	  and	  repeat	  (dotted	  line)	  verses	  switch	  (solid	  line)	  trials	  in	  (d)	  
Experiment	  4	  and	  (e)	  Experiment	  5.	  Error	  bars	  show	  standard	  error.	  
	  
	   	  




Figure	  3.	  Line	  graphs	  tracking	  changes	  in	  face	  ratings	  from	  the	  beginning	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
experimental	  session	  for	  valid	  (dotted	  line)	  and	  invalid	  (solid	  line)	  trials	  for	  (a)	  Experiment	  1:	  
neutral	  faces,	  trustworthiness;	  (b)	  Experiment	  2:	  smiling	  faces,	  trustworthiness;	  (c)	  
Experiment	  3:	  neutral	  faces,	  likeability;	  (d)	  for	  faces	  used	  in	  repeat	  (dotted	  line)	  and	  switch	  
trials	  (solid	  line)	  in	  Experiment	  4:	  neutral	  faces	  as	  targets	  with	  no	  gaze	  movements,	  task-­‐
switching;	  and	  (e)	  for	  faces	  used	  as	  task-­‐switching	  distractors	  with	  no	  gaze	  movements	  in	  
Experiment	  5.	  Error	  bars	  show	  standard	  error.	  †p<.1;	  *p<.05;	  ***p<.001	  
	   	  




Figure	  4.	  Examples	  of	  the	  coloured	  stimuli	  used	  in	  the	  task-­‐switching	  experiment.	  (a)	  The	  
original	  uncoloured	  images	  were	  used	  during	  trustworthiness	  ratings,	  while	  (b)	  the	  green	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and	  (c)	  yellow	  were	  used	  in	  the	  task-­‐switching	  portion.	  (d)	  Trial	  sequence.	  Participants	  
reported	  whether	  the	  face	  was	  coloured	  in	  green	  or	  yellow	  or	  if	  the	  face	  was	  male	  or	  
female,	  depending	  on	  a	  prompt	  before	  each	  trial.	  
	  
	   	  




Figure	  5.	  Example	  trials	  from	  Experiment	  5.	  Points	  to	  note	  include	  the	  task	  prompt	  at	  the	  
start	  of	  each	  trial,	  as	  in	  Experiment	  4,	  which	  was	  then	  followed	  by	  the	  (unmanipulated)	  face	  
image,	  then	  the	  object,	  as	  in	  Experiments	  1-­‐3.	  	  
